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“Do I See What the Market Does Not See?”: 
Counterfactual Thinking in Financial Markets 
Ekatarina Svetlova ∗ 
Abstract: »“Sehe ich etwas, was der Markt nicht sieht?” Kontrafaktisches 
Denken in den Finanzmärkten«. Based on the study of counterfactual thinking 
in financial markets, the paper suggests a deviation from the standard defini-
tion of counterfactuals. Social psychology traditionally defines counterfactual 
thinking as the development of alternative versions of the past events. Two en-
hancements of this understanding are suggested in the paper: the contradicted 
facts are related to the future and are socially constructed. Thus, counterfactual 
thinking should be investigated not only as a common feature of the human 
mentality but also as an element of social life. It is an instrument to cope with 
the complexity of future events in social settings.  
Keywords: counterfactual thinking, financial markets, portfolio management, 
future, predictions, social facts. 
1. Introduction 
Counterfactual thinking is not a new topic. It has been the subject of interests to 
different scientific fields for a long time. Philosophers dealt with counterfactual 
theories of causation and conditions of their truth. Historians disputed if coun-
terfactual reasoning, i.e., mental change of the course of past events, is a pro-
ductive tool for their science or is just distraction and entertainment. Social 
psychologists became especially interested in counterfactual research in the last 
decade and developed it to one of the fastest growing domains within their 
field. At the beginning of this research were publications by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) as well as by Kahneman and Miller (1986) who studied emo-
tions activated by a re-thinking of already happened events as well as ways of 
re-explaining of such events. Those investigations prepared the ground for a 
vast spectrum of psychological research (see Roese and Olsen 1995 for over-
view). 
Social psychology uses a narrow definition of counterfactual thinking. This 
definition is narrow for two reasons. First, it concentrates on counterfactual 
thinking as a process of evaluation of past outcomes. Roese (1997, 133ff) wrote 
for example: “I restrict the term counterfactual to alternative versions of the 
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past. That is, counterfactuals do not refer to future prospects but only to nega-
tions of established facts.” Similarly, Johnson and Sherman (1990, 509) 
claimed: “Counterfactuals…are simply other possibilities to events that have 
happened or are happening.” According to these common definitions, counter-
factual thinking means simply considering what would have been if a different 
action had been selected. In this process, people try to assess the potential of a 
past situation. 
My second objection against the narrow definition of counterfactual think-
ing in social psychology is the focus on the individual development of alterna-
tives. In psychological experiments subjects are confronted with stories and are 
asked to mutate one or another event that led to a known outcome. Those men-
tal changes are undertaken by the experiment participants independent of each 
other in utter isolation. Consequently, the facts that subjects mentally alter are 
not the result of people’s communication and interaction but are given. For 
example, particular verbal versions of situations (the “route” version and the 
“time” version) were offered to subjects who had to complete “If only”-
sentences (“If only Mr. Jones had taken a different route home”, “If only he 
had left the office later” and so on) (Kahneman/Tversky 1982). Those stories 
were constructed by scientists and presented to the experiment participants who 
could not influence them.  
Research of this style was spread to the field of financial markets 
(Lundberg/Frost 1992; Bailey/Kinerson 2005; O’Curry Fogel/Berry 2006). 
This research is a part of the field of Behavioral Finance and is helpful to un-
derstand the individual psychological processes of counterfactual thinking in 
financial markets. At the same time, it can be demonstrated (and this is the 
purpose of the text at hand) that counterfactual thinking in financial markets 
goes beyond the narrow definition suggested by psychology. Investors’ activi-
ties are focused on the future and depend on decisions and actions of other 
market participants. In other words, classical psychological research ignores 
the future-oriented, social nature of the markets. For example, events such as 
price increases or falls are results of behavior and forecasting activities of many 
different actors. They depend on stories that circulate in the markets and are 
products of dispersed narrative activities. They are not given; they are social 
facts constructed and widespread in the markets. Performing counterfactual 
thinking, individual investors relate to facts of this kind and co-create them at 
the same time.  
This is why I suggest having a look at counterfactual thinking from the So-
cial Studies of Finance point of view. Representatives of this scientific field 
assert that understanding of financial markets requires more than investigations 
in Behavioral Finance which is rooted in individual psychology. The applica-
tion of different social sciences as well as of their methods to financial markets 
is necessary. My suggestion is to use ethnography to investigate the orientation 
of market participants towards the future as well as the social nature of facts 
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that are contradicted in the process of counterfactual thinking. This investiga-
tion suggests the necessity of a wider definition of counterfactual thinking.  
The analysis presented in this paper took place in a special area of the capi-
tal markets, namely, portfolio management. In section 2, the distinctive charac-
teristics of portfolio managers as financial market participants will be de-
scribed. It will be shown that forecasting and thus the development of 
alternative scenarios for the future is crucial for their activities in the markets. 
In section 3, I will present the data that were collected during the ethnographic 
field work and were used for the investigation. Then the usage of counterfac-
tual thinking by portfolio managers in their everyday activities will be dis-
cussed in detail. Counterfactual thinking will be described as a plausibility 
check of mainstream (socially acknowledged) scenarios for the future. This 
description requires a wider understanding of counterfactual thinking that will 
be discussed in section 5.  
2. Portfolio management 
Before I specify the role of counterfactual thinking in the everyday activities of 
portfolio managers, I would like to describe briefly the task that portfolio man-
agers deal with. Then it can be discussed how counterfactual thinking helps 
them to perform this task. 
Portfolio managers are financial market professionals who invest the money 
of their clients in different assets, i.e., equities, bonds, derivatives and other 
financial instruments. Their goal is to earn the maximum return for a given risk 
profile. To balance return and risk they invest money not in a single stock or 
bond but in a group of financial instruments which is called portfolio. Portfolio 
is a diversified mix of securities. If the money of many investors is pooled in a 
portfolio, such a portfolio is called a mutual fund. The task of a portfolio man-
ager is to decide which and how many securities to buy, as well as to watch and 
to adjust the portfolio over the course of time.  
In case of an active fund manager the return of a portfolio should be better 
than the return of a fixed benchmark. It means active fund managers should be 
able to earn a positive active return. A particular market index such as the 
S&P500 or the STOXX 50 can serve as a benchmark. Indices contain different 
securities with particular weightings. To earn a positive active return portfolio 
managers have to deviate from the benchmark weightings. Otherwise, if they 
just replicate an index, they will achieve the index performance. Beating the 
benchmark means deviation from the benchmark.  
This task requires an extraordinary forecasting ability. One has to compare 
investment alternatives to decide which of them to overweight or to under-
weight. To be able to do that portfolio managers have to forecast future rates of 
return; those forecasts are based on expected earnings or cash flows. If their 
expectations are favorable, they would overweight a particular security. In the 
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case of negative expectations, they will underweight. In other words, the suc-
cessful construction of an active investment portfolio presupposes the forecast 
of the rates of return.  
Forecasting is the crux of portfolio managers’ activities. This is so because 
deviation from the benchmark should be based upon forecasting ability that is 
better than the ability of the market average, and is proven to be sustainable 
and not random. Otherwise, there is no reason to deviate from the structure of 
the benchmark.  
If the crucial goal is forecasting, then the financial market experts have to 
develop scenarios for the future; their thinking is directed to the future. It is not 
specific for portfolio managers only, but for many other segments of financial 
markets as well and for the economy in general. Economic activities are future 
oriented: decisions about investments, credits, corporate management require 
an assessment of the future. In this context, we have to ask: Can counterfactual 
thinking be of importance in such a setting and help to perform the forecasting 
task better? 
3. Data 
The argument of this paper is based on research that was conducted in several 
German and Swiss asset management companies and banks during 2007 and 
the 1st half of 2008. The focus of inquiry was on decision making and forecast-
ing activities of portfolio managers.  
The data pool of the analysis encompasses twenty four guided interviews 
with investment professionals. The respondents work as mutual fund managers 
in Frankfurt/Main and in Zurich. The interviewed fund managers pursue pre-
dominantly an active investment strategy. Six of them are responsible for 
European blue chip portfolios, two for European small and mid-caps, four for 
emerging markets, two for tactical asset allocation, two for investments in 
bonds and three for structured products. Three fund managers are responsible 
for quantitative investments. Two interviews were conducted with a financial 
advisor and the owner of an independent investment company.  
The duration of the each of the twenty four in-depth interviews was about 60 
minutes. Most of the interviews took place in person, and only one was con-
ducted by telephone. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The evalua-
tion also included coding and categorizing (Corbin/ Strauss 2008). 
Formal interviews were complemented by a 3-month participant observation 
that was conducted in the portfolio management department of a private Swiss 
investment bank in Zurich. The author completed some tasks in the department 
and participated directly in the investment practice. Participation in verbal 
discussions, such as internal and external investment meetings, morning meet-
ings and informal talks on the floor, as well as in the practice of creating 
spreadsheets and presentations, provided additional insight into the practices of 
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the investors. The author could investigate how fund managers talk about the 
future, forecasts and expectations, and what views they act upon. 
Though the sample of collected data cannot be asserted to be entirely repre-
sentative, the author is convinced that it allows a first approximation to under-
standing investors’ techniques in developing scenarios and dealing with the 
forecasting problem. One such technique is counterfactual thinking. 
4. Counterfactual thinking as an analytical tool of portfolio 
managers 
Now, it will be shown in detail how portfolio managers use counterfactual 
thinking to solve the forecasting problem. Forecasting in financial markets is a 
complex task. First of all, there are a large number of factors that influence the 
future development of securities’ prices. In the case of equities, for example, 
prices depend on future payment streams produced by the company like earn-
ings and dividends. They are affected by the so-called fundamental factors, 
e.g., profit situation, product range, market position, and management quality. 
There are also other factors, such as the macroeconomic conditions (interest 
rates, inflation, currency developments, etc.), political expectations (tax poli-
cies, state subsidies, political stability, etc.) as well as the psychology of the 
market players (their expectations, risk preferences, etc.). It is not only impos-
sible to specify all variables; rather, it must always be anticipated that new 
factors are added, such as new products, take-over rumors, etc. All those fac-
tors influence returns of particular companies and markets in different ways.  
One has to keep in mind that portfolio managers do not cover 3-5 compa-
nies. In the interviews, they reported that each of them has between 250 and 
500 companies in the investment universe. The investment universe includes 
companies, in which portfolio managers can invest money. It means that they 
have to make forecasts for up to 500 companies.  
Taking this fact into account, it is unrealistic to expect portfolio managers to 
analyze all of the companies and to estimate all of the influencing factors in 
detail. Portfolio managers are not able to build their own expectations for each 
company. They obviously need some simplification mechanisms that allow 
them to decide in situations when they cannot make a precise forecast. One 
such mechanism is counterfactual thinking. How do professional investors 
proceed in practice? 
4.1 Investors think contrary to the facts. What are those facts? 
Let us take an example: It is November 2007, the subprime crisis jeopardizes 
all investments in the financials. In the morning meeting, the head of the fund 
management department says “We still have the Royal Bank of Scotland in one 
of our portfolios. Should we keep it?” The question is directed to the responsi-
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ble fund manager and requires a clear decision: to keep or to sell. The response 
of the fund manager is “I’ll take a closer look at it.” This “closer look” would 
mean that the fund manager makes a forecast for the expected return of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS).  
However, he does not start to build his expectations from scratch. His first 
step in the decision process is a glance at the consensus estimates that are the 
result of the forecasting efforts of a special group of market participants, 
namely securities analysts. There is a pool of analysts who cover a particular 
company. Each analyst comes up with estimated earnings per share for the 
quarter, the year or the next fiscal year. A consensus estimate number is an 
aggregated forecast, i.e., an average or median of all individual forecasts made 
by analysts covering a particular stock. For example, if four analysts estimate 
next year’s earnings per share for a company at $5.00, $5.05, $5.10, and $4.60, 
the consensus estimate is $4.94. This number indicates that the majority of the 
market expects the earnings per share to be close to $5.00 on average and not 
much lower as one individual analyst suggests. The consensus estimate repre-
sents a mainstream view in the market.  
Behind consensus expectations is usually a story which the market plays and 
which is reflected in the share price. This story is not told by just one market 
participant. First of all, a company’s management provides information on the 
earnings per share prospects. Investor relations communicate them to the mar-
ket; analysts interpret the figures using models and doing research. As a result 
of those communication and interpretation efforts, an investment story emerges 
and spreads in the market. This story is reflected in the consensus estimates. 
For example, consensus numbers suggested in autumn 2007 that RBS will not 
have to make significant depreciations due to the subprime crisis. For the ma-
jority of the market participants, this was a widely accepted scenario for the 
development of this particular company; it was a fact.  
However, this fact is not an event that happened in the past. It is a shared 
story that currently circulates in the market; it is a scenario that the majority 
accepts as the most possible scenario for the future. This scenario delivers a 
shared explanation of what is going on in the market. First of all, it delivers the 
explanation for the current price of the share. A shared market story like “RBS 
will not depreciate much” determines the actual price of RBS. Consensus 
represents the officially known information that is reflected in the security 
price quickly. Here is a characteristic statement of one portfolio manager: 
Consensus represents the market… market price corresponds to the consensus 
very well (The fund manager, European Blue Chips, Zurich).  
However, this insight should make all forecasts that circulate in the market 
uninteresting for fund managers.  
I believe that the problem is not the impossibility of forecasting but the fact 
that the market reflects the forecasts. This is the point. Even if analysts and 
other market participants make good forecasts, the question occurs: How can I 
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use them? I cannot use them because forecasts in the free markets are directly 
reflected in the price. (The quantitative fund manager, Frankfurt/Main) 
Forecasts that are reflected in the price are useless for the decision making 
of fund managers. As described above, the overall goal of fund managers is to 
earn a positive active return, i.e., to deviate from the market to achieve better 
performance. When the consensus forecast represents the market, it delivers 
information about the point from which the fund manager has to deviate. But 
by acting upon consensus forecasts, the fund manager would miss his goal.  
Every fund manager watches consensus. But he doesn’t make money with it. 
He makes money only when he deviates from consensus. For this purpose he 
must know what consensus is. (The quantitative fund manager, Frank-
furt/Main) 
To know consensus does not mean to know only a particular number (for 
example, EPS 2008 for Royal Bank of Scotland is 70 Pence), but to know 
which scenario is already in the price. The next step is to decide how to deviate 
from the consensus story successfully. For this purpose, portfolio managers use 
consensus estimates as point of departure and build their own forecasts. Their 
expectations should be better than those of the market. 
First of all we look what the market reflects in the price. It is useless for me to 
say “we have a positive development now”: when the market has already pri-
ced this development in, I cannot create any added value. One can generate an 
added value only when he makes a non-consensus call… You have to make a 
decision which deviates from the majority. (The head of the department tacti-
cal asset allocation, Frankfurt/Main) 
Therefore, the task of a fund manager is to predict rates of return differently 
from the majority of forecasters. To deal with this problem portfolio managers 
use counterfactual thinking.  
4.2 Counterfactual thinking as plausibility check 
Let me illustrate the use of counterfactual thinking by means of the already 
mentioned example: the analysis of the RBS in November 2007. The portfolio 
manager had a “closer look” at the consensus estimates. He reported: 
I didn’t try to estimate earnings for the whole bank. I made a part-estimate for 
the depreciation requirements. Then I adjusted consensus estimates. That is 
very simple: You see that the company should earn, according to consensus 
estimates, 70 pence per share. There are no depreciations priced in. I look at 
the financial statement, analyze the structure of the assets and see the possibi-
lity for additional depreciation in the amount of 15 pence per share. In this 
way I arrive at the earnings forecast of 55 pence per share.  
The portfolio manager simplified his task significantly: He didn’t analyze all 
divisions of the bank, but identified the depreciation as the key factor for the 
share price in this phase of the market. He assumed that all other variables 
reflected in the consensus remained constant (as ceteris paribus). Then, he asks 
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himself “Do I have a different opinion about this key price driver than the 
market?” This is a counterfactual question. The investor undoes the scenario 
that is widely accepted in the market, and develops his own alternatives by 
mentally changing one element of it, namely depreciation. In other words, he 
asks “Is the market wrong about this particular assumption? What do I see 
differently?” He conducts the counterfactual thought experiment of the kind 
“What if RBS will have to depreciate more than the market assumes? What 
would it mean for the valuation of the assets and for the share price?”  
The portfolio manager described his forecasting process as a plausibility 
check: 
I downloaded the numbers and build my own expectations for the Royal Bank 
of Scotland. I contemplated if the market expectations are plausible. What I 
did is the plausibility check of the market expectations 
Instead of delivering a point forecast or defining all possible scenarios, the 
fund manager checks the plausibility of the one known scenario, i.e., the mar-
ket scenario that is accepted as a conventional wisdom. Counterfactual thinking 
structured as a plausibility check is a technique to deal with the high complex-
ity of the market. It makes the task of a simultaneous prediction of returns of 
many companies and markets manageable. It allows the portfolio manager not 
to arrive at exact predictions of earnings or dividends, but just to predict what 
the market does not know or sees wrongly yet. This is one of the most impor-
tant steps on the way to an investment decision: to keep or to sell the share. In 
our example, the counterfactual thought experiment suggests that there is still 
room for a negative surprise, i.e. for more depreciation due to the subprime 
crisis. The portfolio manager decided that the current market price was too high 
and sold the RBS stock.  
To sum up: Consensus estimates represent the accepted majority view in fi-
nancial markets. They are facts which are already reflected in the market price 
and do not disclose any interesting investment opportunities. Financial market 
professionals regularly question the mainstream scenarios because they can 
make money only by deviating from them. They use counterfactual thinking for 
this purpose: they mentally alter one aspect of the mainstream story, i.e. check 
the plausibility of this aspect. In this way, they arrive at the investment deci-
sion. That is why counterfactual thinking is one of the essential analytical in-
struments in the financial markets and not at all entertainment or distraction. It 
makes the investors’ task of prediction manageable, helps them to explore 
possible alternatives and to invest effectively. 
5. Plea for a wider definition of counterfactual thinking 
Counterfactual thinking as a plausibility check is an important tool for inves-
tors in financial markets. Professional investors assess the potential of the fu-
ture, not of the past. They do it not in isolation from each other but in social 
 155
settings. This obviously requires a wider definition of counterfactuals than the 
one accepted within social psychology.  
At the same time, the above-mentioned work of Roese and John-
son/Sherman already imply the possibility of a wider understanding of the 
counterfactual thinking. For example, Roese (1997, 133) uses also a more 
general definition: “The term counterfactual means, literally, contrary to the 
facts.” When people think counterfactually, they take facts and go beyond them 
to develop alternative scenarios and to encompass other possibilities. Those 
facts do not have to be past events, i.e. some known historical facts like “Napo-
leon lost the battle of Waterloo” or “The first human being in outer space was 
Russian”. Johnson and Sherman (1990, 509) suggest: “It may even be useful to 
think about counterfactuals to the future if a particular future seems so likely 
that it is virtually accepted as truth”, or, in terms of Roese (1997, 133), counter-
factuals refer to “negations of established facts”. Established facts could be the 
widely accepted stories which describe future events and circulate within soci-
ety or in the market.  
As I already mentioned, stories in psychological experiments are con-
structed by scientist; they are fixed. Within society or in the markets, however, 
stories constantly develop further; they are products of narrative activities of 
many different actors. In the case of financial markets, stories are created by 
analysts, investors, representatives of the companies, and politicians. Such 
narratives can be considered as facts of a special kind, especially if they are 
accepted by a majority. At this point, we have connections to conspiracy theo-
ries. Conspiracy theorists contradict what the mainstream accepts as “facts” 
and on this basis develop alternative explanations for past or contemporary 
events. They think contrary to the known facts. The nature of those facts is, 
however, very specific: Often historians know only the “stories” that are con-
veyed, not the “hard facts”, i.e. not the events, not what really happened. Narra-
tives are sometimes the only facts they have. Arguing against a conventional 
wisdom, conspiracy theories argue against the widely accepted stories as facts 
and arrive at alternative explanations. Likewise, portfolio managers contradict 
the mainstream scenarios, produce their own predictions and arrive at deci-
sions. 
The social nature of market narratives cannot be overlooked. Consensus es-
timates and related stories are not the result of an individual effort of a particu-
lar analyst. Numbers and stories are communicated and spread in the market, 
and mutual acceptance makes them to facts. They might be considered as social 
facts in terms of John Searle (1995): They are not a matter of individual per-
ception or opinion; they are commonly accepted and thus are a part of reality. 
According to Searle, social facts have brutal facts (for example, an actual fun-
damental development of a company) as well as mental facts (opinions of indi-
vidual analysts) behind them. However, consensus estimates as social facts are 
constructed “on top of brute physical facts” (Searle 1995, 35); they are the 
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result of collective intention of the group of investors that use them. Social 
facts are often results of performative speech acts under particular conditions 
(Austin 1992). They can be considered as “established facts” in the definition 
of Roese above. 
The acceptance of narratives as facts that might be mentally contradicted 
would be one possible expansion of the definition of counterfactual thinking. 
The other expansion is related to it: Stories need not refer to the past or the 
present only; they can deal with the future. In the financial markets, they are 
the collectively constructed predictions. 
It should be mentioned that there is already a discussion about the usage of 
counterfactual reasoning to describe future alternatives. Psychologists suggest 
that counterfactual thinking has a preparative function: While people explore 
alternatives to the occurred events, they learn about causalities and prepare 
themselves for better decision making in the future (Roese/Olson 1995, John-
son/Sherman 1990). “Counterfactual generation can prepare us for maintaining 
our beliefs in the future; for coping with an uncertain, unexpected, or stressful 
future; and for paving the way for changing in the future” (Johnson/Sherman 
1990, 509). There are investigations which demonstrate that people predict 
better when they use counterfactual thinking (Tetlock 2005; Hoch 1985). It can 
be shown, for example, that if the subjects of an experiment are asked to de-
velop a scenario and contrary reasons simultaneously, i.e. if “they are explicitly 
instructed to consider the counterfactual, that is, a reason why they might be 
wrong” (Hoch 1985, 721), they demonstrate an increased accuracy of predic-
tions.  
Portfolio investors also develop contrary arguments for a mainstream sce-
nario about the future, asking where analysts can be wrong. This procedure 
allows them not only to make better predictions (see, for example, Montier 
2007, 99ff) but to predict and to decide at all. Portfolio managers check the 
plausibility of the future scenarios, mentally changing one or two of their as-
pects. They can conduct mental experiments of this kind for many companies 
simultaneously. It allows them to stay focused and to reduce the task of devel-
oping many scenarios to building an opinion about one or two key factors for 
the future of the company. In other words, investors use counterfactual thinking 
to cope with the complexity of future events in the market.  
The two suggested enhancements of the understanding of counterfactual 
thinking – the reference to socially constructed narratives as facts and the ex-
plicit reference to the future – might open new ways for prospective research 
on the topic. Counterfactual thinking could be investigated then not only as a 
common feature of human mentality but also as an element of social life. 
Closer attention should be paid to the social nature of facts that are contra-
dicted. If they are narratives, it is important to investigate who tells them and 
under what conditions as well as if they are performative or if they are results 
of performative speech acts. In general, considerations on the questions “What 
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are facts?”, “What is reality?” are crucial for further research. Those questions 
might be approached from a philosophical perspective. At the same time, social 
studies with their elaborated methodological apparatus might be useful and 
complement psychological research with its individual perspective. The same 
applies to the time dimension of counterfactual thinking. If it is not just about 
thinking contrary to past events, an in-depth analysis is required to understand 
what such “future facts” – to which counterfactual thinking is related – are, 
how they emerge or how they are constructed.  
References 
Austin, John L. 1992. How To Do Things With Words: The William James lectures 
delivered at Harvard University in 1955. London: Oxford University Press. 
Bailey, Jeffrey J., and Chris Kinerson. 2005. Regret Avoidance and Risk Tolerance. 
Financial Counseling and Planning 16: 23-28. 
Corbin, Juliet M., and Anselm L. Strauss. 2008. Basics of qualitative research: 
techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory. Los Angeles: Sage 
Publications. 
Hoch, Stephen J. 1985. Counterfactual reasoning and accuracy in predicting per-
sonal events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 11: 719-731. 
Johnson, Marcia K., and Steven J. Sherman. 1990. Constructing and reconstructing 
the past and the future in the present. In Handbook of motivation and cognition: 
Foundations of social behavior, ed. Edward T. Higgins and Richard M. Sorrenti-
no, vol. 2, 482-526. New York: Guilford Press. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1982. The simulation heuristic. In Judg-
ment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, 
and Amos Tversky, 201-208. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Dale T. Miller. 1986. Norm theory: Comparing reality to its 
alternatives. Psychological Review, 93: 136-153. 
Lundberg, C. Gustav, and Dean Elliott Frost, 1992. Counterfactuals in financial 
decision making. Acta Psychologica 79: 227-244. 
Montier, James. 2007. Behavioural Investing: A Practitioner’s Guide to Applying 
Behavioural Finance. Chichester: Wiley & Sons. 
O’Curry Fogel, Suzanne, and Thomas Berry. 2006. The Disposition Effect and 
Individual Investor Decisions: The Roles of Regret and Counterfactual Alternati-
ves. Journal of Behavioral Finance 7: 107-116. 
Roese, Neal J. 1997. Counterfactual Thinking. Psychological Bulletin 121: 133-
148. 
Roese Neal J., and James M. Olson. 1995. What might have been: The social psy-
chology of counterfactual thinking. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Searle, John. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press. 
Tetlock, Philip E. 2005. Expert Political Judgment: How Good is It? How Can We 
Know? Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
